Where do MEPs really stand on innovation policy?

For a lot of us Brussels, part of the job is predicting how political groups in the European Parliament might vote on different topics.

Take the example below. It plots the distribution of votes in the last legislature on a series of migration-related plenary amendments. If an MEP is at 1.00 (the right of the x-axis), they voted for every ‘open’ migration amendment. At -1.00 (the left of the x-axis), they voted against or abstained on them.

It reads as you’d expect. Most MEPs from the right of the spectrum (ID and, to a lesser extent, ECR) were grouped around -1.00. The centre-right and liberals (PPE and Renew) were more dovish, and the left-of-centre (especially the S&D and the Greens) clustered around 1.00. (1)

Distribution of MEP votes on migration policy

You’d probably also be able to intuit the graph below too, on climate and environmental policy. Here, 1.00 represents tighter restrictions on polluting practices and/or internalising externalities, and -1.00 represents the opposite. (2, 3)

Distribution of MEP votes on climate policy

Where it gets interesting is in the case strategic autonomy.

Distribution of MEP votes on strategic autonomy policy

I have argued before that it is unusual to find bell curves in complex systems, but this is pretty much what we see here. For groups like PPE and S&D, (and slightly less so for Renew and ECR), the average MEP is not far from bang in the middle or being pro- and anti-strategic autonomy.

I had put this down to ‘Strategic Autonomy’ being a relatively new concept, especially compared migration and climate policy discussions. I presumed this meant it’ll take a while for the debate to filter through the EP, into coherent group positions and party lines.

That is why innovation policy is so interesting. The amendments I selected for the graph below pit the precautionary principle against the innovation principle in areas like crop and genomic technologies, artificial intelligence, energy etc. While perhaps not as mainstream as climate change or immigration, the precautionary / innovation debate is established in Brussels. (4) So I was surprised not to see the same U-shape trend we saw in the migration and climate charts, but instead a mix of curves.

Distribution of MEP votes on innovation policy

Clearly, you can predict voting trends along group lines for migration and climate policy with some confidence, but the same can’t really be said for innovation policy.

Then, perhaps it’s best not to think of innovation as a policy in its own right? Perhaps an MEP’s views on innovation is a result of their views on other policies? Perhaps how one views innovation is determined by how one views the fight against climate change (e.g. degrowth versus techno-optimism), or the importance of European strategic autonomy?

If so, when mapping how an MEP votes on innovation against how they vote in another field, we’d expect some kind of clustering at the corners (e.g. anti-innovation principle, pro-internalising externalities in the case of de-growthers).

Turns out, this is not the case for strategic autonomy. In the chart below, the darker the dot, the more MEPs there are at that coordinate. There is a pocket at the bottom-left (around -0.8, -0.8), otherwise, MEPs are pretty clustered in the centre, and the darkest dots are all at 0 on strategic autonomy axis.

Plotting MEP positions on innovation policy (x-axis) against strategic autonomy (y-axis)

Mapping innovation against climate, the result is a bit different. There are definitely fewer MEPs in the centre. And a handful of clusters emerge near the corners. The largest (number 1) comprises 66 MEPs, almost all of whom are from The Left and Greens. The second largest (number 2) comprises 47 mostly from ECR and ID. It is also interesting that 16 of the 18 MEPs at point 7 are Polish ECR.

Plotting MEP positions on innovation policy (x-axis) against climate policy (y-axis)

Still, combined, the seven circled dots account for a third of all MEPs. So, while perhaps there is some merit in saying an MEP’s view on innovation is linked with their view on a more established area like climate policy, it’s hardly compelling.

Perhaps, then, the case of the Poland is instructive? Maybe country of origin has a stronger influence on shaping political views on innovation?

Kind of. Looking at the distribution of votes by countries, rather than by political groups, some Member States (most clearly in the case of Croatia below) have MEPs from across the political spectrum relatively clustered together along the x-axis. But for most countries, this is not the case.

Distribution of Croatian MEP positions on innovation principle (read x-axis)

In the end, it’s probably a mix of ideological, national, and other factors which best explain how MEPs think about innovation policy, as three examples from the left-leaning groups demonstrate.

If you’re from The Left, regardless of your nationality, you’re likely to be very anti-innovation principle (read along the x-axis, and shoutout to whoever can identify the outlying MEP).

Distribution of The Left MEP positions on innovation principle (read x-axis)

If you’re from S&D, national factors (or regional ones, in the case of the Baltics) play a larger role. Positions vary within the group, but also some clear national pockets emerge. Even factoring in a 10% dissenting rate, among the five largest national delegations in the S&D:

• 19/21 Spanish MEPs were between 0.1 and 0.6;

• 18/20 German MEPs were between -0.3 and 0;

• 18/20 Italian MEPs were between -0.4 and -0.2;

• 9/10 Portuguese MEPs were between 0 and 0.4;

• 9/10 Romanian MEPs were between -0.4 and 0.6;

• Also, 5/6 Baltic MEPs all voted 1.00 (and 0 on strategic autonomy).

Distribution of Green MEP positions on innovation principle (read x-axis)

In conclusion, I think interest representatives (be they from industry, civil society,  consultancies, wherever…) can run the risk of over-indexing on nationality and political groups when analysing votes - probably because they are the most visible, measurable, and institutionally-collected variables. (The EP website doesn’t make readily available information on age, education levels, economic status and other factors which also impact how one sees the world). (5)

MEPs are individuals as well as datapoints. Perhaps that outlier from The Left has an aunt who is a theoretical physicist, and has been nuclear-pilled over Christmas dinner? Perhaps the S&D group adviser and coordinators responsible for whipping votes are overwhelmed or don’t prioritise the topic? Perhaps the German Greens includes a number of highly-qualified agro-engineers who have taken a highly informed position on the GMO debate one way or the other? (None of these are true, but you get the point).

Data can give you the detail without necessarily explaining the “why?”. Overarching statements can give you a“why?”, without necessarily giving you the detail. In the future, I am going to try to get better at giving my clients both.

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(1) I believe the Greens don’t show up on the graph because they all scored 1.00, so technically, there was nothing to distribute. The boxplot below supports this.

(2) Although I suspect the PPE has adopted a more ‘business-friendly’ position in recent years, after the BBB started breathing down the necks of the Christian Democrats in the Netherlands.

(3) See point 1.

(4) Indeed, the Precautionary Principle was enshrined in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.

(5) There might also be a tendency to underestimate the importance of behind-the-scenes whipping, deal-cutting and decisions on performative voting.